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Moldova’s Power Transition:
A Chance for the EU to Act in Its Eastern 
Neighborhood by Cristina Gherasimov
A new transfer of power has taken place in the EU’s Eastern neighborhood that raises 
vigilant hopes for the future of the Eastern Partnership. This is a chance for Moldova 
to address its democratic deficit and rebuild its international reputation after vested 
interests captured its state institutions. The new government, however, needs the support 
of EU partners. While this pro-reformist executive brings big opportunities – including 
for the EU – it also poses risks that need to be cautiously considered.
Moldova, a tiny country between Ukraine and Romania, 
one of the six Eastern Partnership countries, kept the EU 
on high alert last week (June 7-14, 2019). The country was 
submerged into a political crisis on June 8 after the outgo-
ing government refused to cede power to a legitimately 
appointed new one with opposition leader, Maia Sandu, 
as Prime Minister. Six days later, after intense interna-
tional and domestic pressure, the former government 
finally resigned.
The parliamentary elections in Moldova on February 
24, 2019, produced a hung parliament in which none of 
the represented parties were able to independently form a 
government. After months of protracted negotiations, an 
unexpected coalition was formed. The pro-Russian So-
cialists’ Party – which is informally led by President Igor 
Dodon – and the ACUM (‘Now’) bloc – which is formed 
of two strongly pro-European parties led by Maia Sandu 
and Andrei Nastase – joined forces despite different views 
on major issues such as the country’s foreign policy. This 
alliance, against all geopolitical odds, pushed the former 
ruling Democratic Party into opposition. Its party leader 
Vlad Plahotniuc – who transformed Moldova in a cap-
tured state, making use of all state resources to maintain 
himself in power during the past five years – fled the 
country. The new government now has the complex 
task of cleansing the system of the consequences of his 
oligarchic rule and the corrupt practices that strangled 
the economy, political opposition, civil society, and the 
independent media.
The EU seems ready to help. On June 15, the EU 
Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations, Johannes Hahn, promised 
“substantial EU support and advice” to the new govern-
ment. Two days later, the Foreign Affairs Council in 
Luxembourg discussed the country’s political situation. 
Commissioner Hahn is also paying a visit to Chisinau on 
June 19 to discuss with Prime Minister Sandu how the 
two parties could work together to more quickly defreeze 
the EU’s macro-financial assistance for Moldova. Both 
sides waited for this new political opening to restore 
Moldovan democracy, which was rapidly fading under 
Plahotniuc’s tight grip.
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Upcoming Opportunities for the EU
The EU could test its will and capacity for a renewed East-
ern policy in the region. The fact that EU member states 
did not manage to issue a joint statement on the political 
crisis that unfolded last week is a reflection of the lack 
of a common vision and, more broadly, the existence of 
differentiated interests of various EU actors in the shared 
neighborhood. This also explains EU’s weak capacity and 
lack of tools to frame a clear Eastern policy toward its 
neighbors in a year when the EU should be celebrating a 
decade of the Eastern Partnership. A coordinated support 
for the Sandu government could be an opportunity for 
the EU to clarify for itself as a global player how far it is 
willing and able to go to support complex democratiza-
tion processes in the neighborhood in the context of rising 
power competition in Eastern Partnership countries. 
A strong and stable democracy in Moldova is in the 
EU’s best interest if it wants to have a safe eastern border. 
By taking an active role in supporting the new govern-
ment, the EU can help solve mounting security concerns. 
ACUM campaigned on an anti-corruption platform aimed 
at dismantling Plahotniuc’s oligarchic regime and reset 
Moldova’s track record of pro-European reforms. Sandu’s 
government also prioritizes the strengthening of the rule 
of law, the reform of the judiciary, and the creation of 
economic opportunities for its citizens to invest and work 
in the country. By strengthening such processes – which 
have been highlighted by EU actors numerous times as 
lagging behind in implementation – the EU can help re-
store security and stability at its border in a country that 
became a serious source of brain drain, labor migration, 
and money laundering schemes. 
The Sandu government has the political will and the 
human capital to transform Moldova into a success that 
would also benefit the EU. The EU once labeled Moldova 
the “poster child” of the Eastern Partnership. That was 
too early and too rushed, since key reforms that would 
consolidate democracy were not implemented once they 
started challenging the vested interests of the ruling 
elites who eventually blocked the reform process. The EU 
and its member states learned their lesson and became 
more cautious when assessing reform implementation in 
the region. They do need to showcase, however, that the 
Eastern Partnership is a credible initiative that is able, in 
the long run, to secure a “ring of friends” for Europe. It 
would also give EU partners a strong reason to continue 
supporting democratic efforts in the Eastern Partner-
ship region in the context of the negotiations of the next 
Multiannual Financial Framework for 2021-2027, the 
EU’s long-term budget. This is particularly important in 
light of the difficulties the EU also currently encounters 
in the other two frontrunners in the region, Georgia and 
Ukraine. Key reforms in these states have also stalled, 
vested interests are strongly entrenched in their politics, 
and each deepened its conflicts with Russia as a result of 
expressing their Euro-Atlantic aspirations. Of all previous 
governments, it is the current one that has the potential 
to prove that the EU has not lost on the efforts it has 
invested in Moldova.
Hidden Risks for the EU
The EU may not see results any time soon. The last decade 
has shown on numerous occasions that transformation 
processes in the post-Soviet space, particularly in coun-
tries with entrenched vested interests in their domestic 
politics, are complex phenomena that first and foremost 
require time. Moreover, a top-down approach to democ-
ratization proved mostly unsustainable so far. Principles 
of good governance need to be embedded at the societal 
level, and only then can they be effectively transposed 
into politics. The vast majority of genuine pro-reformers 
in Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine come from 
civil society. Reforms have the chance to be organically 
embraced only where there is strong societal support for 
pro-European aspirations. The EU needs to be cautiously 
aware that the creation of the Sandu coalition govern-
ment is an act of political maturity and an important step 
forward in restoring democracy. But the new executive 
also may need to take a few steps back considering the 
complex underpinnings that the alliance with the pro-
Russian Socialists rests on.   
Equally important, the EU and its member states have 
to be prepared not to see results at all. The coalition 
government has at its core irreconcilable ideological and 
geopolitical differences that can significantly shorten its 
lifespan and throw the country into snap elections. ACUM 
advocates for closer ties with the EU, while Socialists see 
Moldova integrating with Russian-led regional projects. 
Investing support and diplomatic efforts into this govern-
ment may result in another missed opportunity and even 
more Eastern Partnership fatigue.
The Russia factor is strongly present in this alliance 
and may undermine the full extent of reforms if these 
prove to jeopardize its interests in Moldova. As a result, 
EU actors may get caught up in a renewed geopoliti-
cal competition with Russia. Moscow made it clear that 
it supports this coalition government, even while the 
political crisis was quickly unfolding. By having the pro-
Russian Socialists in the coalition, Russia has simultane-
ously ensured a seat at the table and punished Plahotniuc 
for challenging its elites. How dependent on Moscow the 
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Socialists and President Dodon himself are is not clearly 
known. President Dodon, however, never shies away from 
publicly displaying his close relationship with Putin. A 
recent video – which was leaked by the Democratic Party 
of Plahotniuc – catches the President with Plahotniuc 
during coalition negotiations admitting that the Russians 
allegedly support the Socialists with financial allocations 
of $700,000-$800,000 per month. While President Dodon 
has denied the accusations of receiving foreign funding 
– which is banned under Moldovan legislation – it is clear 
that whatever amount of support he gets from Kremlin, 
he would not have entered this coalition without the 
approval of the Russians. In light of competing priorities, 
the EU – and certain member states who want a better 
relationship with Russia – may be caught unwilling or 
unprepared to play an active role if this disturbs their 
already difficult relationship with Russia.
Moldova illustrates that democratization in the post-
Soviet space is by far not a linear process as many would 
expect. It is clear that the risks for the EU of supporting 
this coalition government are as big as the opportunities 
it could bring if the executive delivers on the reforms it 
committed to under the EU-Moldova Association Agree-
ment and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement. The European community could contribute 
to a democratic reset in Moldova, which is in the EU’s best 
interest. The EU could equally repeat the same mistakes 
again. The EU, however, strives to be a global player. If 
so, this is an opportunity to prove it – even if the stakes of 
doing so are high. 
Dr. Cristina Gherasimov is Research Fellow of the Robert 
Bosch Center for Central and Eastern Europe, Russia, and 
Central Asia at the German Council on Foreign Relations 
(DGAP).
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